Remains of a political wreck
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In the immediate aftermath of the 31 March elections, an energy emerged in Turkey that had not been seen for many years. The opposition, which had suffered a major defeat in the elections less than a year earlier, had failed to fulfill the public expectation for change and had gifted President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan four more years in his political career.
Of course, there was great uncertainty within the ruling party before the 14 May elections. The unsustainability of an increasingly decaying system and the deepening social crisis caused by the AKP-MHP palace regime had begun to cause serious questioning of the existing structure even in the conservative camp.
The AKP’s cadres, which have become increasingly corrupt in the last decade, the spread of nepotism throughout the organization, bureaucrats being seen side by side with organized crime leaders, the crimes of the earthquake and the subsequent abandonment of the people to their fate, the economic crisis becoming more and more unmanageable and the income inequality turning into a serious abyss have caused even right-conservative voters to distance themselves from the AKP. In short, the bottom wave in the sociology of Turkey was caused by the “one man” who has made his power absolute and continued to gather energy day by day.
However, the AKP’s efforts to institutionalize “elitist Islam”, which is specific to its own “hawks” and supporters, and to create an elite Muslim stratum that lives in pleasure, has led to a serious class rupture within the conservative world. Erdoğan, who used to be the “nobody for the orphans”, now embraced the image of a leader who tries to rule the state “on command” from his palace, traveling with large security armies and distributing life, and turned his back on the masses to whom he had once frequently referred and to whom he owed his power.
Undoubtedly, the conservative electorate, which shares the poverty that has no other basis other than religious references, felt culturally close to the AKP, but underneath they harbored a bubbling “discontent”.
The spirit of 94 was summoned!
At a level where the “fantasies” of simulative ancestral heritage and world leadership created in TV series such as Kurtlar Vadisi, Diriliş Ertuğrul, Payitaht did not work in the face of economic devastation, the image created by Erdoğan began to disintegrate as a result of concrete conditions. The “one-minute” show to reinforce the image of a strong leader has been replaced by the shaping of the image of a leader who does not raise a voice against trade with Israel, the “enemy of the ummah”!
In short, AKP faced an “angry” society in the 31 March elections without a leader and with candidates who could not show any presence. Although similar rhetoric is used in every election period, the reality of the pot was reflected in the ballot box. And Erdoğan faced a defeat he had never suffered in his history. But the worst thing for him was that he failed to defeat his “rival” Ekrem İmamoğlu despite all state means and instruments of oppression.
Although this defeat is somehow “normalized” by the AKP, it does not change the fact that it is a harbinger of destruction. So much so that Imamoğlu, the only leader Erdoğan could not defeat throughout his career, has now become the only real leader of the opposition.
In this respect, as President Erdoğan knows very well, the possible transformation that will emerge from the local elections will create a “butterfly effect” and in a very short time will lead to the destruction of the “monstrous order” built in 20 years with a powerful punch. Considering this possibility, the AKP has invoked the “Spirit of 1994” (Welfare Road Municipalism) to strengthen its ideological ground again, but in vain!
AKP is facing a civil war
In his work On War, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote: “The influence of hostile elements cannot be considered over unless the will of the enemy is broken unless the people submit…” Based on this observation, the AKP is a movement that has been polarising society for nearly 20 years and building a political base for itself through the enemies it has created. Erdoğan has given great honors to the conservative groups close to him and tried to control his political opponents through oppression, imprisonment, ignoring, marginalization, and intimidation.
After the Gezi resistance in 2013, the Palace regime, which tried to intimidate a section of society through internal enemies, has melted since 2019 in the face of the society that it could not take over, as Clausewitz said. At this point, the AKP, which has been unable to destroy its political opponents, has been facing an ongoing and growing civil war in the organization for about a year.
Most important of all, the alliance formed by both AKP and MHP has become dysfunctional at this point. Therefore, the two parties, which are gradually weakening and rapidly sinking into internal conflicts and purges, will no longer have any meaning other than being tied to each other’s feet. In fact, according to the picture that emerged in the local elections, it is clear that both of these parties are unable to train cadres and continue on their way with old cadres. In short, in the picture of Turkey that has emerged, the AKP, unable to feed the congregations and the cronies, is stuck on the sidelines with the exhaustion brought about by the lack of staff.
Support of the sects shifted to the YRP
Speaking of congregations, one of the important details of the elections was the position taken by the congregations. After the 2019 local elections, the leading congregations, whose resources had shrunk after the local elections and who could not transfer resources from the government, were not very visible, unlike in other elections. This picture suggested that the political Islamist bloc behind the AKP was about to disintegrate.
AKP has been a coalition of sects from the beginning. However, after the coup attempt on 15 July, differences began to emerge in state-sect relations. The purge of the Gülen sect and the subsequent crackdown on the Adnan Oktar sect caused concern, even if it was not openly expressed. The message was: “We will give you what you want, but do not break our word!” Not only that, the role of the state in the power struggles within the rapidly conglomerating sects affected the center of balance in the war between the parties, leading to increased concerns in the central structure of the sects. And the search for an alternative to the “powerless” government began. It was precisely at this point that the Yeniden Refah Partisi (YRP), led by Fatih Erbakan, climbed onto the political scene and became the third party in Turkey.
Let us recall that the sects that had lined up like a rope to vote for the AKP in the previous elections and made statements, refrained from making statements of support in this election. Muhammad Saki al-Husseini, the leader of the Serhendi group, which is seen as the most populous and powerful branch of the Menzil sect, did not make a statement of support for the AKP. In fact, according to publicized information, he remained silent after the meetings with Yeniden Refah.
The second was the Ismailaga community, which is known to be close to the AKP. The congregation, which had openly supported the AKP until now, did not make a statement for the first time. Only Cübbeli Ahmet, who was excommunicated from Ismailağa, openly supported the AKP, but his influence was very limited. When the expected statement of support from İsmailağa failed to materialize, Erdoğan decided to pay a visit to the leaders of the sect the day before the election.
In addition, when the support of big sects such as the İskenderpaşa and Erenköy congregations, which are branches of the Nakşibendi sect, was not forthcoming, every vote that was not cast for the AKP went to the YRP.
Of course, it is known that the social ties of these communities are limited to a very narrow framework. However, what draws our attention here is the fact that the AKP’s ideological center has begun to suffer major breaches. Of course, this is not only related to the position taken by the sects. On the other hand, the fact that the reality created by political Islam threatens social development also causes a significant part of the society to break its ties with these movements. This has led to the erosion of support for the AKP for nearly six years.
What will Erdoğan do?
So, what will Erdoğan do in this situation? Erdoğan, who has lost the municipalities and cannot get the support of the communities, will undoubtedly look for alternative ways in this process. The first of these is that he will resort to certain maneuvers under the current circumstances to regain his lost image.
We know that Erdoğan wants to be elected President once again. However, after the results of the local elections, it is clear that this will not be possible with the 50+1 system. Therefore, it is conceivable that the first solution to this problem for Erdoğan is to bring the new constitutional debates to the agenda. Besides, it is also clear that Erdoğan is facing a serious dilemma. In particular, Erdoğan, who wants to ensure his legitimacy in a situation where his social support is diminishing day by day, may create a moderate atmosphere by demanding a kind of “restoration” from his plane.
However, in any case, it does not seem possible for a government like the AKP, which operates on fragile grounds, to continue this process without alliances. However, Erdoğan, who can no longer present a “strong” image and who has been proven to be defeated by his only political rival, may make an underhanded call for “unity again” to his former alliances that he has liquidated after this point.
In this respect, even if he takes a series of steps under the name of “innovation” within his organizational base, it is inconceivable that metastasis will not be seen in a political subject where corruption has taken the form of cancer. All that remains is for Erdoğan to realize his plans for a safe retreat. But this will not be easy in a criminalized political practice.